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Abstract
Since entering office, US president Trump has reversed key multilateral achievements
of his predecessors, initiating a new US retreat from multilateral cooperation. For
other governments wishing to preserve and deepen existing global agreements, this
has posed the question of whether and how multilateral cooperation can work with-
out the leadership and support of the dominant global power. International relations
scholars have already debated the possibility of “nonhegemonic cooperation” in earlier
periods marked by US unilateralism. This article draws on these previous analyses to
evaluate the current prospects and limits of a “multilateralismminus one” in three key
global policy areas: nuclear arms control, climate change, and trade.
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monic cooperation – international organizations – nuclear weapons – arms control –
climate change – trade
Downloaded from Brill.com04/04/2019 09:10:28AM
via Hessische Stiftung Friedens
24 fehl and thimm
Global Governance 25 (2019) 23–46
1 Introduction
US president Donald Trump has repeatedly characterized his approach to the
world as “America first.” What this means for the multilateral global order was
already apparent in his nomination speech at theRepublicanNational Conven-
tion in July 2016: “Americanism, not globalism, will be our credo. As long as we
are ledbypoliticianswhowill not putAmerica first, thenwecanbe assured that
other nations will not treat America with the respect that we deserve.”1 In his
2017 and2018 speeches at theUNGeneralAssembly, he vowed to “defendAmer-
ica’s interests above all else”2 and “choose independence and cooperation over
global governance, control, and domination.”3 His repeated warnings that the
United States would “no longer be taken advantage of”4 illustrate that Trump
perceives international politics in narrow “transactional” terms,5 governed by
a zero-sum logic. One country’s gain comes at the loss of another country, with
few possibilities of mutual benefit. This sentiment runs counter to the logic of
multilateral institutions, which are intended to foster cooperation by providing
benefits to all participants.
Two years into Trump’s presidency, it is evident that he has sought to put
his rhetoric into practice by reversing keymultilateral achievements of his pre-
decessors. Under Trump, the United States has withdrawn from climate and
trade agreements, multilateral arms control initiatives and UN bodies such as
the Human Rights Council and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO); it has cut down funding for UN peacekeeping and
UN agencies dealing with Palestinian refugees, population control, and global
warming; and it has threatened key multilateral organizations including the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). During his first year in
office,Trumpmade foreignpolicy headlineswithdeclarations of intent, but did
not always followuponhis unilateral statementswith actual policies. However,
since John Boltonwas appointed as national security adviser, the pace of treaty
withdrawals has picked up and the unilateral direction of the administration is
no longer indoubt. For the rest of theworld, this has posed increasingly difficult
problems.6 US hegemony and support for multilateral institutions used to be a
1 Bump and Blake 2016.
2 White House 2017.
3 White House 2018.
4 White House 2017; see also the near-identical formulation inWhite House 2018.
5 Zenko and Lissner 2018.
6 Jentleson 2017; Lake 2018; Stokes 2018.
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cornerstone of the international order. As themost influential country retreats
from or even undermines global institutions, other governments that have an
interest in maintaining and advancing the multilateral agenda have been fac-
ing hard questions:What, if anything, can and should be done to accommodate
Washington’s concerns and keep it engaged inmultilateral fora? Failing a com-
promise, how effective are global institutions without US participation?What
are the political costs of cooperatingwithout or even against theUnited States?
Who can fill the leadership vacuum left by the United States?
In this article, we analyze the prospects and limitations of advancing global
governance in the Trump era through a “multilateralismminus one.”7 To assess
the effectiveness and political feasibility of this approach, we compare the
present situation to earlier periods of US opposition to multilateral coopera-
tion. Despite Trump’s unusual presidency, US governments questioning multi-
lateral institutions are nothing new—and neither are doubts about the United
States’ ability to exert effective leadership in the face of global power shifts.
International relations (IR) scholars have debated the possibility of “nonhege-
monic cooperation” since the 1980s. This literature provides some clues about
the circumstances under which amultilateralismminus one can be successful.
In Section 2, we therefore review earlier research on nonhegemonic coop-
eration, situating the scholarly debate in the historical context of repeated ups
and downs in the US commitment to the multilateral order. Rather than sub-
jecting the propositions in this literature to a new test, we use its findings to
derive key factors that have helped or hindered nonhegemonic cooperation in
past instances. In Section 3, we use these factors as analytical guidance in eval-
uating both the political feasibility and the likely effectiveness of ongoing and
potential nonhegemonic cooperation initiatives in the Trump era, compared
to earlier historical periods. We focus on three key issue areas of global gover-
nance where the Trump administration’s challenge to multilateral frameworks
has been particularly critical: arms control, climate change, and trade.
Our analysis suggests that, despite some variation across policy areas, the
prospects for “cooperating without America”8 have generally improved. New
actors such as emerging powers from the BRICS club and China in particular,9
as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have acquired stakes and
influence in multilateral negotiations. At the same time, many countries are
7 The term is adopted from Krause 2004, 43–59, especially 53. We understand it as referring to
the attempt to build newmultilateral institutions or tomaintain the functionality of existing
ones without the participation or leadership of the United States.
8 Brem and Stiles 2009.
9 The BRICS include Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
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turning to minilateral, informal, and ad hoc arrangements, which are increas-
ingly replacing universal, formal, legally binding commitments. Both develop-
ments are heightening flexibility among participants and enabling new con-
stellations of like-minded actors to cooperate on global issues. And yet, the task
of managing the resulting fragmentation of the global order and the fluidity of
new coalitions are increasing the demands on political leadership, suggesting
that nonhegemonic cooperation will be neither easy to orchestrate nor neces-
sarily successful.
2 IR Theory and the Question of Nonhegemonic Cooperation
2.1 The Debate in Historical Context
The US relationship with the global multilateral order has long been ambiva-
lent.10 After World War II, the United States took the leadership in setting up
the institutional pillars of the present multilateral order: the United Nations,
the Bretton Woods regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and (within its sphere of influence)
NATO.11 Following this phase of hegemonic institution building, global power
shifts and repeated phases of US disengagement cast doubt on the United
States’ willingness and ability to exert multilateral leadership—and prompted
IR scholars to discuss under what conditions states might cooperate in the
absence of an order-creating hegemon.
Reflecting the postwar experience, scholarly thinking was initially domi-
nated by “hegemonic stability theory,” which attributed the creation andmain-
tenance of a liberal (economic) order toUS hegemony.12 This changedwhen, in
the 1970s, contemporaries began to observe signs of US economic declinewhile
postwar economic regimes remained relatively stable. IR scholars now argued
that institutionalized cooperation could outlast the decline of a hegemon, and
that coalitions of middle powers might even create new institutions.13 In this
period, arguably the greatest disruption of the postwar multilateral system
came in the field of monetary governance with President Richard Nixon’s 1971
decision to give up on the US dollar’s convertibility to gold. The decision was




13 Keohane [1984] 2005; Snidal 1985.
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exchange rates came increasingly under strain due to fallingUS shares of global
economic output and growing US budget and balance of payments deficits.14
It thus was the perceived US weakness in the 1970s, rather than the unilater-
alist turn of US foreignpolicy thatwould followunder PresidentRonaldReagan
in the 1980s, which triggered the first IR discussion of nonhegemonic coopera-
tion. Reagan engaged in unilateral interventions, questionedmultilateral arms
control,withheldUSdues to theUN, andwithdrew fromUNESCO.15Yet he also
accepted new multilateral commitments such as the UN Convention against
Torture.
The early debate about nonhegemonic cooperation ended with the United
States’ economic and military resurgence late in the ColdWar, which exposed
the “myth of lost hegemony”16 and led to the proclamation of a “unipolar
moment” after the Cold War had ended.17 Both President George H.W. Bush
and his successor Bill Clinton used the new US preponderance to reinvigo-
rate the United States’ commitment to existing multilateral institutions and to
contribute to a new wave of institution building that produced, inter alia, the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and theWTO. This
new multilateral turn led IR scholars to draw comparisons between US hege-
mony in the postwar and post-Cold War periods.18 The analogy turned out to
be short-lived, however.
Under pressure from bureaucratic infighting and a unilateralist Congress,
the Clinton administration became reluctant to enter ambitious new agree-
ments, most notably the ICC and the Ottawa Convention on antipersonnel
landmines.19When both treatieswere concluded over US objections, observers
heralded the beginning of a “non-hegemonic diplomacy.”20 The successive
embrace of aggressive unilateralism under George W. Bush intensified the
debate. Agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol continued without US sup-
port whereas others, such as the proposed verification protocol to the Biolog-
ical Weapons Convention, were dropped in the face of US opposition. These
developments prompted fresh analyses of the conditions under which non-
hegemonic cooperation is feasible and effective.21 Thus, the second IR debate
14 As Keohane notes, however, despite the disintegration of explicit regime rules there was a
“continuity in regime principles” that testified to the potential for continued cooperation





19 Thimm 2016, 51–97, 143–183.
20 Cooper 2002, 1–18, especially 1.
21 Bower 2017; Brem and Stiles 2009; Cooper 2002; Fehl 2012.
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about nonhegemonic cooperation evolved against the background of a unilat-
eral United States that appeared to be bursting in strength rather than declin-
ing.
President Barack Obama reembraced multilateralism, although strong do-
mestic opposition denied him some achievements. He led his country into the
Paris Agreement on climate change, but at the price of making the latter less
binding.While his administration cooperatedwith the ICC, the prospect of the
United States formally joining the court remained as elusive as Obama’s aim of
ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). He concluded
the bilateral New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia,
but could only persuade Congress to ratify it by promising a modernization of
US nuclear weapons that deepened divisions within themultilateral arms con-
trol regime.
Despite these limitations, most observers during Obama’s presidency saw
the greater challenge to the multilateral order in a new global power shift,
which became particularly visible in the global financial crisis. Echoing the
1980s debate, scholars now pondered whether and in what shape US- and
Western-built institutions would survive the rise of China and other new pow-
ers.22 Mounting reform pressure on the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank and deadlock at the WTO, as well as rising powers’ initiatives to
set up new institutions, such as the BRICS Development Bank and the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), all indicated challenges to established,
Western-dominated multilateral institutions.23
2.2 Lessons Learned
PresidentTrumphas inherited these challenges toUS andWestern dominance.
At the same time, he and key figures in his administration do not share Pres-
ident Obama’s instinct to compensate for the loss of US power by locking
US policy preferences into multilateral rules. Thus, for the first time in post-
war history, US unilateralism coincides with declining US power, making both
the first and the second debate about nonhegemonic cooperation relevant
to the present situation. Contributions to both debates highlight a range of
factors that make cooperation without the United States effective and politi-
cally achievable. These factors can be used as points of reference to assess the
prospects and limitations of this approach in the Trump era.
22 Ikenberry 2011.
23 Stephen 2017.
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The first group of factors, highlighted in the more recent debate about US
unilateralism and nonhegemonic cooperation, concerns current and futureUS
policies and their likely impact. To judge the effectiveness of a multilateralism
minus one approach in a given policy area, other governments must take into
account the relevance of the United States to the specific problem at stake
and to its multilateral solution and weigh the cost of losing US support—as
well as any cost that the United States could impose on them to block their
initiatives—against the potential alternative: Is it feasible to accommodate US
objections to keep it on board, what would be the cost of such a compromise,
and would it be honored by the US government?24 In addition, they must con-
sider the likelihood of future US administrations reversing current US policies.
A second group of variables central to both debates about nonhegemonic
cooperation concerns potential alternative leaders. Are other key players in the
policy area interested in preserving or advancing existing multilateral institu-
tions, or do they prefer unilateral action or alternative institutions that could
challenge or undermine existing fora?25 Are they willing to challenge US hege-
monic leadership? And if so, are they able to form a coalition that is large and
stable enough to fill the leadership vacuum left by the former hegemon?26
A third cluster of factors, highlighted particularly in the second debate, con-
cerns the role of private actors in facilitating or obstructing nonhegemonic
cooperation. In the 1990s and 2000s, transnational civil society organizations
successfully pushed for the new nonhegemonic diplomacy. Domestic industry
representatives, worried about their competitiveness, opposed many multilat-
eral commitments without US participation.27
In the next section, we apply these theoretical insights to understand the
challenge of nonhegemonic cooperation in the evolving Trump era, and to
compare the effectiveness and political feasibility of a multilateralism minus
one across policy areas and historical experiences.We use the above list of fac-
tors as aheuristic tool for our analysis, yet remainopen to identifying additional
relevant factors that have not featured prominently in past discussions of non-
hegemonic cooperation.
24 Stiles 2009; Fehl 2012, 3–27.
25 Morse and Keohane 2014.
26 Snidal 1985; Brem 2009; Vabulas and Snidal 2014.
27 Cooper 2002; Anderson 2000.
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3 Nonhegemonic Cooperation in the Trump Era
3.1 Nuclear Arms Control
As both the most powerful nuclear-weapon state and a historical leader on
nonproliferation and disarmament, the United States has been pivotal to the
nuclear arms control regime. The regime’s core treaty, the NPT, restricts the
possession of nuclear weapons to five official nuclear weapon states, while also
committing them to pursuing “negotiations in good faith” on their eventual
disarmament (Article VI). President Obama initially declared his support for
nuclear disarmament, but agreed to themodernization of US nuclear weapons
in exchange for Senate ratification of the New START treaty. Progress there-
fore was already limited; nonetheless, Trump has begun to undermine even
Obama’s hard-won successes.
3.1.1 US Policy and Impact
In October 2018, the Trump administration announced that it would with-
draw from the bilateral Intermediate-RangeNuclear Forces (INF)Treaty,which
prohibits the United States and Russia from developing and deploying ground-
launched midrange nuclear (and conventional) missiles. While the US intelli-
gence community has long accusedRussia of violating the treaty,Trump’s plans
to abandon it and develop newmidrangemissiles risk triggering a new nuclear
arms race. The administration has also turned down Russian offers to renew
New START, which limits the number of US and Russian deployed strategic
nuclear weapons, after its expiry in 2021.28 Both steps could soon leave the
world’s largest nuclear arsenals without any legal constraints. The 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) further aggravates the situation by upgrading the role of
nuclear weapons in US strategy and envisaging new “low-yield options.”29 All
of these policies not only will endanger bilateral strategic stability, but also will
further weaken the NPT’s crumbling disarmament pillar. Ultimately, this will
also undermine the treaty’s nonproliferation pillar, which is politically tied to
disarmament in a “grand bargain.”
More immediately, global nonproliferation efforts have been set back by
Trump’s attempts to undo the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
a seven-party agreement designed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear
weapons. After announcing the US withdrawal from the pact in May 2018,
Trump not only has reinstated previous US sanctions on Iran, but also has
threatened aggressive secondary sanctions against foreign companies doing
28 Reif 2018.
29 Mount 2018.
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business with Iran.30 Should this pressure push Iran to revive its nuclear pro-
gram or take hostile counteractions, a new regional arms race or even a US-
Iranian war could follow.31
3.1.2 Feasibility and Cost of Compromise
While the cost of losing US support for nuclear arms controls is consequently
high, there are few indications that Trump is—or would have been—open to
compromises on any of the disputed issues. With regard to Iran, his declared
aim of obtaining a “better deal” is neither realistic nor earnest. The maximal-
ist demands raised by his administration are unacceptable not just to Iranian
hard-liners.32 Even European efforts to increase pressure on Iran and negoti-
ate possible side agreements to the JCPOA could not sway the president—
although State Department diplomats were close to agreeing on a strategywith
their European counterparts.33
On the greater cause of preventing the next nuclear arms race, much
depends on the United States’ rivals China and Russia. But if New START is
any indication, Trump is less interested in substantive proposals for compro-
mise than in broader great-power relations.
Despite Trump’s extreme attitude, obstacles to effective arms control go
beyond his administration. Congress has been a driving force behind plans for
newmissiles and the INF crisis,34 and Trump’s confrontational Iran policy has
solid support among congressional Republicans (and some Democrats). Given
this state of affairs, it seems unlikely that a future administration will cham-
pion nuclear disarmament and arms control beyond the status quo before
Trump. Unlike in other policy areas, arms control advocates cannot hope that
any ambitious new initiatives will be embraced by the United States in the not
too distant future.
3.1.3 Private Actors
This does not bode well for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
that was concluded in 2017 at the United Nations. While NGOs generally play
a lesser role in nuclear arms control than in other policy fields, the initiative
for the ban treaty goes back to civil society activists frustrated about the lack of
progress on nuclear disarmament in the NPT framework. Inspired by the suc-
30 Geranmayeh 2018.




Downloaded from Brill.com04/04/2019 09:10:28AM
via Hessische Stiftung Friedens
32 fehl and thimm
Global Governance 25 (2019) 23–46
cess of the antipersonnel landmines ban, NGOs coalesced with like-minded
states to push for the negotiation of a newdisarmament treaty outside of estab-
lished fora, preventing nuclear powers from exercising a veto. The idea, which
won the 2017 Nobel peace prize for the NGO campaign, is to shame nuclear
powers into action. In the landmines case, this “new diplomacy” was successful
in setting a moral standard that even states who refused to join have followed:
with the exception of the Korean peninsula, the United States has complied
with the treaty’s prohibition of mines even as a non-member of the mine ban
treaty. However, it is improbable that this success can be repeated with strate-
gically more important (nuclear) weapons. Even modest moves toward disar-
mament are unlikely as long as the ban treaty lacks support from the most
influential states.
3.1.4 Alternative Leaders
Prospects for nonhegemonic cooperation vary across the different issues dis-
cussed above. Other countries are only bystanders to the US-Russian New
START and INF discussions. The nuclear weapons ban is opposed by all (offi-
cial and unofficial) nuclear powers; Europe has been deeply split about this
new treaty, with small countries like Austria leading the pro-ban coalition and
NATO members opposing it. Yet the policy of ignoring the prohibition agree-
ment altogether—all NATO members except the Netherlands abstained from
the negotiations—risks making future efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation
more difficult. At the least, Europeans should acknowledge the legitimacy of
the effort and engage with its supporters to prevent the rift in the nuclear arms
control regime from getting wider.
Prospects for nonhegemonic leadership are best regarding the JCPOA. The
European Union (EU) in particular has been working hard to save the deal,
which it perceives as its most important diplomatic success to date. The
regional bloc not only revived its older Blocking Statute to counter potential US
sanctions on European companies, but it also is taking the unprecedented step
of directly undercutting US sanctions by setting up a Special Purpose Vehicle
(SPV), designed to enable continued Iranian exports.While it remains unclear
at the time of this writing what goods the SPV will cover and who will have
access to it, it is unlikely to substantially soften the blow of US sanctions on
Iran’s economy.35 Still, the European initiative sends an important political sig-
nal that Europe is willing to spend political capital on rescuing the JCPOA.36
35 Geranmayeh and Batmanghelidj 2018.
36 Irish and Emmott 2018.
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This signal could help Iran’s moderates to defend the deal against hard-liners
perhaps long enough for a more conciliatory US president to win office.
3.2 Climate Change
On climate policy, tensions between theUnited States andmultilateral regimes
long preceded Trump. At first sight, Trump’s announcement on 1 June 2017 to
pull out of the Paris Agreement on climate change mirrors George W. Bush’s
decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC sixteen years
earlier. As in 2001, the US withdrawal threatens the regime’s effectiveness and
raises the issue of how to advance efforts to fight global warming without US
participation and leadership. And yet on close examination, the differences
between the two episodes are more instructive than the similarities.37
3.2.1 US Policy and Impact
In 2001, the United States was the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases,
accounting for 39 percent of global emissions. By 2013, it had been surpassed
by China, which now accounted for 26 percent of global emissions (with the
United States ranking second at 14 percent).38 The fact that China has no com-
mitments under the Kyoto Protocol, but is a key participant in the Paris Agree-
ment,makes clear that theUS contribution to the problemof climate change is
relatively less significant today. Many state-level and local emissions reduction
initiatives in the United States are continuing even without federal support.
The US withdrawal from the global regime is still painful, but not as detrimen-
tal as it was in 2001.39
Despite the shrinking US share of global emissions, its nonparticipation
could endanger the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement by weakening others’
implementation of the agreement. This risk relates to a broader global trend
toward softer multilateral governance, which has also affected climate negoti-
ations.40 While both Kyoto and Paris are legally binding treaties, targets, time
tables, and measures are voluntary under the Paris approach, in contrast to
Kyoto’s binding regime of commitments enforced by sanctions. This soften-
ing up of the climate regime helped to bring the United States on board—but
it also means that to develop a “compliance pull” comparable to that of hard
international law, the Paris Agreement must rely on “naming and shaming”
37 Pickering et al. 2018.
38 World Resources Institute 2014.
39 Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2018 argue that US emissions are likely to decline in spite of
Trump’s lenient climate policies.
40 Vabulas and Snidal 2013.
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and on financial incentives.41 For both mechanisms US participation would
have been amajor advantage. In the Pledge and Review Process throughwhich
voluntary commitments aremonitored under the Paris Agreement, the United
States could have led by example in setting a high standard of implementation,
increasing themoral pressure on others.42Washington alsowould have paid for
about one-third of the $10 billion Green Climate Fund (GCF) until 2020, and
would have contributed even more to the $100 billion per year that developed
countries have vowed to mobilize to help developing countries reduce emis-
sions and adjust to climate change.43
3.2.2 Feasibility and Cost of Compromise
In light of the nonbinding nature of the Paris Agreement, Trump’s repeated
offers to renegotiate its terms appear as empty rhetoric. Although the accord
does not allow states to unilaterally weaken their nationally determined con-
tributions (NDCs), noncompliance remains unsanctioned, which implies that
changes in theParis dealwouldnot benefit theUnited States in substance. Sym-
bolic concessions could help if the Trump administration actually wanted to
remain inside Paris, but this seems doubtful.44
However, there are reasons to hope that the United States may reverse its
decision to shun the Paris Agreement even without further compromises at
this stage—under a new president. In 2001, a key reason for Kyoto supporters
to move ahead was the hope that a future US administration would reengage
in global climate negotiations. With President Obama taking the leadership
on the Paris Agreement, their calculus payed off. Today’s domestic opposition
to Trump’s climate policy—business leaders, Democrats, states, and cities—is
even more vocal than back then, providing even more grounds for optimism
regarding a future US policy shift.
3.2.3 Alternative Leaders
In 2001, there was a real danger that other major emitters would follow the
US decision to leave Kyoto in a “domino effect.” To save the protocol, Euro-
pean diplomats had to engage in extensive shuttle diplomacy.45 In contrast, the
global reaction to the Paris withdrawal was much prompter and more unani-
41 Bodansky 2015, 155–165, especially 161.
42 Victor 2017.
43 Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2018 see the loss of the US contribution to climate finance
as the most problematic consequence of the US withdrawal.
44 Wirth 2017.
45 Vogler and Bretherton 2006.
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mous. Again, European governments took the lead in declaring that Paris was
“irreversible,”46 but other key players also quickly signaled their determination
to stick with the agreement. Media attention has focused on China’s forceful
reaffirmation of its commitment to the climate regime, but the continued sup-
port of Brazil, India, and South Africa is equally important. Since 2009, these
emerging economies have formed an alliance with China, the so-called BASIC
bloc, which has become increasingly influential in UN climate negotiations.47
This established coalition could facilitate the task of building a new nonhege-
monic leadership group. Already, the EU, Canada, and China have convened
a new Ministerial on Climate Action attended by thirty-four governments to
replace the US-led Major Economies Forum—an informal grouping that had
played a key role in preparing the Paris Agreement.48
The striking difference in reactions to the 2001 and 2017 US withdrawals is
partly explained by the more advanced institutional stage of today’s climate
regime. The Paris Agreement has been in force since November 2016 and, at
the earliest, allows parties to exit the treaty four years after that date—a pro-
cedure that even the Trump administration has vowed to respect. The Kyoto
Protocol had not reached that stage when GeorgeW. Bush withdrew in 2001.
More importantly, unlike in 2001, the EUandother key players such asChina
have a vested interest in battling climate change andadvancing green energy. In
addition, emerging economies are eager to preserve the climate finance system
established as part of the Paris Agreement, fromwhich they stand to benefit as
major recipients.49
And yet all of these key players will need to do more to make Paris not
only lasting, but also effective. A key question is whether they will be able to
lead by example under the Pledge and Review Process. Currently, neither the
EU nor BASIC members are on track to meet their Paris commitments. The
one exception is India, which has made strides toward its renewable energy
goals.50 However, sustaining progress in the developing world will hinge on
developed nations keeping their financial promises—including by shoulder-
ing the financial commitments shed by Washington. At the time of writing, it
was still uncertain whether the rest of the developed world will collectively
step up to this task. After Trump’s withdrawal, Germany’s environment min-
ister declared that “no country that refuses joint international solidarity can
46 Stefanini and Oroschakoff 2017.
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expect that others just step in to fill the gap.”51 Yet filling the gap is exactly
the kind of leadership that would be required to overcome conflicts over cli-
mate finance, which have proved a major stumbling block at the 2018 Bonn
and Bangkok climatemeetings.52While Germany itself recently announced its
intention to increase its contribution to the GCF, others such as Australia have
followed Trump’s lead in ruling out any further donations.53
3.2.4 Private Actors
A bolder approach by European and other Paris supporters would also unlikely
receive the same kind of private sector opposition that Europeans faced in
2001. After George W. Bush’s Kyoto withdrawal, energy lobbyists (and policy-
makers) in Europe and elsewhere feared that their adherence to the climate
accord would provide an advantage to US competitors. In 2017, the few voices
expressing this sentiment—for instance within the German Christian Demo-
cratic Union (CDU) party—were met with public condemnation.54 In stark
contrast to 2001, even in the United States leading energy companies urged
Trump to remain in the Paris Agreement, reflecting the massive green energy
investments by the private sector despite US nonparticipation in Kyoto.55
3.3 Trade
The most radical departure from traditional US foreign policy under Trump
has happened on trade. The criticism that the liberal trade order and past US
support for it had not served US interests well is central to Trump’s interna-
tional agenda. Since entering office, he has reversed his predecessor’s deci-
sion to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), threatened to leave the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the WTO, and undermined
the multilateral trade order by pressuring countries into bilateral negotiations
and by imposing tariffs against allies and rivals alike. Because of the tradi-
tional US commitment to free trade, there was little need for nonhegemonic
cooperation in the past. Now that this is changing, nonhegemonic coopera-




53 “Germany to Double Donation for UN Climate Change Fund” 2018; Karp 2018.
54 “Berliner Kreis erntet Kritik” 2017.
55 Raphelson 2017.
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3.3.1 US Policy and Impact
It is still not clear if Trumpwants to reformWTOrules or do awaywith the orga-
nization altogether. The administration has used various provisions under US
law to impose a range of tariffs on imports, ostensibly not to disrupt free trade
but to protect US security and to counter others’ “unfair” trade practices.56 In
January 2018, Trump announced antidumping measures against foreign solar
panels and washing machines. In March, his administration implemented tar-
iffs of 10 percent on steel and 25 percent on aluminum imports based on a
national security exemption to WTO rules. After a temporary suspension of
these tariffs with respect to some allies expired, Canada and the EU imple-
mented countervailing measures, as did China. In June, based on charges of
unfair practices relating to technology transfer, intellectual property, and inno-
vation, Washington imposed tariffs on a long list of Chinese imports. China
responded in kind, prompting two more rounds of additional US tariffs and
Chinese retaliations.
While technically the United States is not in violation of WTO regulations
as long as no ruling by the organization’s dispute settlement body has been
issued, its justifications for protectionistmeasures—especially the exemptions
claimed on national security grounds—are questionable.57 Furthermore, even
as theUnitedStates is filing complaints against others’ retaliatingmeasures, it is
blocking the appointment of judges to theWTO’s appellate body. US represen-
tatives claim that they are using the veto to forceWTO reform, but have shown
little interest in Canadian and European proposals to that effect. The adminis-
tration’s real goal thus seems to be to undermine themultilateral trade regime’s
system of centralized dispute settlement—arguably the central function of the
WTO at a time when new global trade rounds are out of reach anyway. If the
seats remain unfilled, the number of appellate judges will fall below three in
2019, in which case the panel would no longer meet the quorum for dispute
resolutiondecisions.58Themeasures already implementedand theuncertainty
about the future are depressing global economic growth.59
3.3.2 Feasibility and Cost of Compromise
Because Washington’s ultimate goals are unclear, identifying potential com-
promises remains elusive. This problem is most pronounced in the escalating
tit-for-tat application of protectionist measures between the United States and
56 Brown and Kolb 2018.
57 Lawrence 2018.
58 “America Holds theWorld Trade Organization Hostage” 2017.
59 Freund et al. 2018.
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China. Despite themany legitimate grievances about China’s trade practices—
foremost the lack of transparency about connections between state and pri-
vate enterprises with all its implications—the specific accusations from the
United States keep shifting.60 Add to this the fact that trade issues are mixed
with security issues concerning the long-term strategic rivalry between the two
countries, and it becomes unclear what concessions would bring the United
States to scale back tariffs. The criticisms leveled against others, like Trump’s
economically misguided focus on bilateral trade deficits, are just as confusing.
This represents a challenge: on the one hand,Washington’s protectionist mea-
sures outside the WTO should be met with unified resistance, as they would
undermine the multilateral trade system at a fundamental level; on the other
hand, where US criticisms are justified, countries in the crosshairs would do
well to take a conciliatory approach. For instance, although Germany’s current
account surplus is arguablymore to thedisadvantage of its Europeanneighbors
than the United States, taking measures to address it may be a way to signal
willingness to compromise.61
3.3.3 Private Actors
Despite some opportunistic support for specific protectionist measures, the
private sector in the United States generally advocates against tariffs.62 Protec-
tionismhurts companieswith international supply chains and the retail sector.
The United States has a trade surplus in the services, not least because of the
global dominance of internet giants such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, and
Apple. Their importance to the global economy presents its own challenges for
regulators, but their businessmodel is the antithesis to protectionism. Further-
more, the globally active US service industry—even beyond the tech giants—
wants to avoid becoming a target of countermeasures. In some instances, the
private sector has been able to exert a moderating influence; for example, by
averting plans for a border adjustment tax or preventing the president from
exiting NAFTA without a replacement. Yet Trump’s willingness to take risks
and his disregard for the consequences of his decisions limit the influence of
the private sector while he is in office.
3.3.4 Alternative Leaders
Power relations between the main actors are more balanced on trade than
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omy and European investment in the United States is strong. China is becom-
ing more assertive, illustrated by the fact that it launches its own initiatives
suchas theRegionalComprehensiveEconomicPartnership, sometimes viewed
as a TPP competitor. The countermeasures of those targeted by US tariffs—
whether China, Canada, or the EU—attest to this new confidence.
In addition, the emergence of alternative leaders is aided by the rise of bilat-
eral, regional, andmegaregional trade agreements. The United States itself has
championed these formats, valued for their flexibility and ability to circumvent
veto players from blocking progress in the WTO’s long-stalled Doha Round.
Now, this very flexibility could enable others to circumvent a protectionist
United States. For instance, the EU is concluding bilateral agreements with
Japan, Canada, Mexico, and others. TPP participants are moving ahead with-
out the United States under the leadership of Japan. These efforts promise to
mitigate the fallout from protectionist disruptions to international trade and
indicate a potential for nonhegemonic cooperation. At the same time, they
highlight the challenge for free traders in coordinating an increasingly frag-
mented global trading system while pushing back against US protectionism.
In particular, it has proven difficult to resist US pressure to negotiate bilat-
eral deals to avoid punitive measures. Mexico struck a deal on a successor
agreement to NAFTA, leaving Canada scrambling to be included. Under this
deal, the United States was granted benefits that it would have enjoyed under
TPP while imposing restrictions on a future Canadian-Chinese trade agree-
ment. The EU has thus far managed to hold off tariffs against European car
imports by reportedly agreeing to buy more US agricultural products. Within
the WTO, one concrete measure to signal continued support for the multi-
lateral trading system in the face of US pressure, and thereby cooperating
without the hegemon, would be to approve new appellate judges by major-
ity vote if Washington continues to hold their appointments hostage to its
demands.
4 Conclusion
For the first time in postwar history, a period of US unilateralism is coinciding
with increasing challenges by other powers—most notably China and other
BRICS states—to US dominance. The relative decline of the United States
across various issue areas is turning cooperation without its leadership or even
participation into a more realistic prospect. This trend has resulted not only
from the shifting balance of power in the state system, but also from the rising
importance of new nongovernmental actors in global governance. Transna-
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tional civil society networks often advocate “leaving America behind.” While
some business actors can gain from the fragmentation of regulatory regimes
that results from US unilateralism, for many the benefits of harmonization
through multilateral means outweigh the costs.
Although these factors work together to improve the prospects for nonhege-
monic cooperation, concrete initiatives have remained limited to date. There
is no single country or region that can replace US leadership. The EU, with its
experience with supranational governance and its professed commitment to
advancing the multilateral order, would be one important piece to the puzzle,
but it keeps punching below its weight. The selective engagement of China and
its (also selective) willingness to accept more responsibilities on the interna-
tional stage open up possibilities for new coalitions, as does the increasingly
prominent role of nongovernmental actors inmultilateral diplomacy.However,
alliances among these very different players will be easier to create and sustain
in areas such as climate change than in policy fields such as human rights or
Internet governance, where China opposes the liberal agenda of global institu-
tions, or nuclear disarmament, where China sides with the United States and
other nuclear powers while the EU is split. Political linkages across these issue
areas could further complicate the task of assemblingmultilateralist coalitions.
The increasing diversity of multilateral formats—including minilateral, infor-
mal, and ad hoc arrangements—enhances flexibility among potential coali-
tion partners and can thus facilitate nonhegemonic cooperation. And yet this
development is not without risks. The shift from global to regional and bilat-
eral trade agreements threatens to fragment the global trading system and
disadvantage those too weak to defend their interests. Softer forms of global
governance—for instance, in climate policy—mean that agreements are no
longer self-executing and require sustained political leadership to be effec-
tive.
In addition to both general trends and issue-specific configurations of con-
temporary global governance, the case for nonhegemonic cooperation is
strengthened by the Trump administration’s unwillingness to compromise,
which is on display across all issue areas. One consequence is that support-
ers of multilateral regulation do not have to ponder the difficult question of
how much substance they are willing to sacrifice to keep the United States
on board—a dilemma they repeatedly faced with the Clinton and Obama
administrations. Another possibility is that the Trump administration’s bully-
ing tactics, while paying off in the short run, will work to unify other countries
and generate a policy backlash further down the line. Indications of such a
development—which was already visible to some extent under the George
W. Bush administration—can be seen not only in public opinion surveys, but
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also in recent voting patterns at the United Nations63 and in calls for challeng-
ing the dominance of the US dollar as international currency.64
This opens a window of opportunity to make global governance less depen-
dent on US leadership and more resilient against attempts to undermine it.
Contemporary political decision-makers could draw inspiration from the pro-
posal made by Swedish foreign minister Olof Palme in 1985 to cap national
contributions at 10 to 12 percent of the total UN budget so as to reduce the
organization’s dependence on its biggest donor countries. At the time, Presi-
dent Reagan’s secretary of state George Schultz opposed the proposal for fear
of losing US influence. Today, Trump actively calls for the rest of the world to
shoulder a greater share of the burdens of multilateralism, opening a window
of opportunity to make institutions less susceptible to US blackmail.
The challenges of nonhegemonic coalition building sketched above make
plain that the task will not be an easy one. Although today’s global gover-
nance landscape offers more options for circumventing the “reluctant hege-
mon” United States,65 realizing them and achieving effective outcomes will
require sustained political commitment by supporters of the global multilat-
eral order, in Europe and beyond.
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